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NOTE
USE CASE PRODUCT MARKETS AND
THE SPIRIT OF REASONABLE
INTERCHANGEABILITY
Denis Hurley*
This Note posits that a single product with multiple, non-reasonably
interchangeable use cases can function like multiple products, ex-
changed in multiple product markets, for purposes of assessing antitrust
liability.
In antitrust law, individual product markets are defined by the prin-
ciple of reasonable interchangeability (or substitutability). Where a sin-
gle product has multiple uses that are not reasonably interchangeable,
the use cases should define the product market. The lay concept of what
constitutes a single product is not applicable to antitrust law when a
single product has multiple, non-reasonably interchangeable use cases.
As a result, antitrust liability should attach where a seller leverages mar-
ket power in a unique use case of one product to foreclose competition in
another use case of the same product.
I use the recent Third Circuit case Eisai v. Sanofi-Aventis, in which
plaintiff Eisai alleged that defendant Sanofi improperly leveraged market
power in a unique FDA-approved indication (use case) of an anticoagu-
lant drug to coerce more sales in competitive indications, to illustrate my
argument.
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INTRODUCTION
In May 2016, the Third Circuit affirmed a district court grant of
summary judgment for the defendant in antitrust dispute Eisai v. Sanofi-
Aventis (Eisai).1 The Third Circuit rejected a novel theory of antitrust
monopolization liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act that the
plaintiff characterized as bundling contestable and incontestable de-
mand.2 Eisai claimed that Sanofi's volume-based discount policies for
anticoagulant drug Lovenox improperly leveraged Lovenox's FDA ap-
proval for multiple "indications"-or use cases-in medical settings.3
The FDA had not approved Eisai's competing anti-coagulant drug for the
1 Eisai v. Sanofi-Aventis, 821 F.3d 394 (3d Cir. 2016).
2 Id. at 401.
3 Id. at 406 (citing, in large part, Eisai's expert testimony). Note: When I refer to the
Eisai case I use the term "indication," but when discussing use-case based product markets
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same indications.4 Eisai argued that Sanofi's discounting practices effec-
tively bundled together two different types of demand for Lovenox in a
manner that improperly maintained Sanofi's market power in the anti-
coagulant drug market.5 The Third Circuit rejected the claim on the
facts, but may have left the door open to the underlying theory.6
In the case, the district and circuit courts both treated the drug Love-
nox as a single product. Eisai's complaint had originally asserted a
stronger conception of the relevant product markets based on the drug's
FDA-approved indications embodied in its complaint. But by the time
the litigation had progressed to plaintiff's submission of a brief in oppo-
sition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, Eisai had aban-
doned this definition of the relevant market in favor of one based on
Lovenox as a single product occupying a single product market.
This Note argues that Eisai's theory of liability (assuming it could
be proven) is fundamentally sound under current antitrust law. For pur-
poses of antitrust liability, Lovenox's multiple approved indications
could have allowed the single drug to function as multiple products ex-
changed in multiple product markets. Sanofi could have improperly
leveraged one or more of the drug's unique indications-assuming mar-
ket power in these indications-through volume discounting on all Love-
nox indications. Such a discounting scheme could coerce more sales of
Lovenox for its non-unique use cases in which it lacked market power.
Plaintiff's initial argument, dependent on a drug indication-based defini-
tion of the relevant product markets, is consistent with antitrust law and
the underlying purposes of the law.
At base, this Note argues that a single product that has multiple uses
is not necessarily exchanged in a single product market. A single prod-
uct's uses can define the product markets in which it is exchanged if the
single product is not reasonably interchangeable among its multiple uses.
For purposes of antitrust liability, a single product in the lay sense is not
necessarily a single product in the antitrust sense.
This Note proceeds as follows. First, I introduce the foundations of
current U.S. antitrust law, courts' methods of defining product markets
for antitrust analysis, and predatory pricing, tie-in, and bundling
claims-all of which lay a foundation for my argument. Second, I re-
view Eisai and the plaintiff's theory of the case. Third, I explore why the
Eisai theory of liability is consistent with the law and its rationale. Fi-
generally, I refer to "use cases." From a theoretical perspective, they embody the same
concept.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 See id. at 409. ("But our conclusion may be different under different factual
circumstances.").
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nally, I address the implications and limitations of defining and applying
use case product markets.
I. BACKGROUND ANTITRUST LAW
A single goal undergirds American antitrust law: protecting compe-
tition.7 American antitrust law is grounded in the Sherman Antitrust Act
(Sherman Act or Act). Section 1 of the Act makes "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce" illegal.8 Section 1 targets multi-party, agreement-
based anticompetitive conduct, such as price-fixing cartels. 9 The law
seeks to prohibit only unreasonable restraints on trade.10
Section 2 of the Act makes monopolization and attempted monopo-
lization illegal." Section 2 targets single-firm anticompetitive conduct. 12
To prove a Section 2 monopolization claim, a plaintiff must show two
elements: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident."1 3 To prove a Section 2
attempted monopolization claim, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the de-
fendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a
7 Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975) ("[T]he sole aim
of antitrust law is to protect competition . . . ."); Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition."); Edward K. Esping, et al., Corpus Juris
Secundum: Monopolies, 58 C.J.S. Monopolies § 7: Purpose of antitrust regulation, Dec. 2016
Update.
8 15 U.S.C. § 1 ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal."); United States v. ALCOA, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (1945) ("[Congress]
did not condone "good trusts" and condemn "bad" ones; it forbade all.").
9 15 U.S.C. § 1; Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775
(1984); Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540
(Year) (noting that "[t]he crucial question" for Section 1 claims is whether the challenged
anticompetitive conduct "stem[s] from independent decision or from an agreement").
10 See Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
11 15 U.S.C. § 2. ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a fel-
ony, and, on conviction thereof.").
12 See American Needle Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 189-191 (2010);
John J. Miles, 1 Healthcare and Antitrust Law, Section 1:2: Purpose and Definition of the
Antitrust Laws, Dec. 2016 ("[T]he test for lawfulness under the antitrust laws is not an activ-
ity's effect on the firm harmed by the challenged conduct, but rather the activity's effect on
competition in the market as a whole.").
13 U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-571 (1966).
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specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achiev-
ing monopoly power." 14
The touchstone of a Section 2 claim is the anticompetitive result of
monopolization or attempted monopolization. 15 In making a Section 2
claim, a plaintiff can present evidence of any conduct that it alleges to be
anticompetitive. 16 Through an accumulation of Section 2 case law,
courts and scholars have classified certain types of anticompetitive con-
duct that repeatedly underpin Section 2 claims. Predatory pricing, tie-
ins, and bundling are three types of conduct that can support Section 2
claims. In this Part, I first address the crucial concept of market defini-
tion. I then introduce predatory pricing, tying, and bundling. Together
these parts lay a foundation for the Note's overall argument.
A. Market Definition
Market definition is an essential concept in antitrust law. In the
context of a Section 2 claim, the relevant market defines the arena of
legal analysis. Defining the market focuses attention on the economic
area in which an alleged monopolist exerts improper influence.17  A
broader market reduces the potency of alleged anticompetitive conduct.
A narrower market increases it. Antitrust defendants necessarily fight
for the former, and plaintiffs for the latter.
Market definition involves two distinct dimensions: geographic
market and product market.1 8 The relevant geographic market consists
of the area of effective competition. 19 "The purpose of the search for the
relevant geographical market is to find the area or areas to which a po-
14 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). Section 2 can also
support a claim of conspiracy to monopolize, which, like Section 1 claims, requires an agree-
ment between two parties. Plaintiffs tend not to assert conspiracy to monopolize claims be-
cause Section 1 claims are easier to prove. Section 2 claims require a showing of market
power; Section 1 claims do not. Broad. Music, Inc. v. HearstVABC Viacom Ent. Serv.'s, 746 F.
Supp. 320, 326 (1990).
15 See Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal Antritrust Policy in TRADE REGULATION: CASES &
MATERIALS, at 35, eds. Pitofsky et al. ("What matter[s] is whether trade was restrained (or
monopolized) or not.") (emphasis in original).
16 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). The Sherman Act
does not delineate what conduct is "exclusionary" or "anticompetitive." A plaintiff must only
show that the conduct that brought about monopoly power or attempted monopolization is not
"a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." Id.
17 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) ("Without a definition
of that market there is no way to measure [the defendant's] ability to lessen or destroy compe-
tition."); see also William Holmes & Melissa Mangiaracina, Antitrust Law Handbook, Sher-
man Act Section 2, Section 3.4: Actual Monopolization-Defining the relevant market and
monopoly power, Nov. 2016.
18 See William Holmes & Melissa Mangiaracina, Antitrust Law Handbook, Sherman Act
Section 2, Section 3.4: Actual Monopolization-Defining the relevant market and monopoly
power, Nov. 2016.
19 U.S. v. E. L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1956).
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tential buyer may rationally look for the goods or services that he
seeks." 20 The relevant product market-broadly-is "composed of
products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purpose for
which they are produced-price, use and qualities considered." 21
Courts do not employ a single straightforward test for market defini-
tion in any given context or across contexts. But courts consistently de-
lineate markets with a focus on a product's functional characteristics, not
on literal or lay conceptions of what constitutes a single product or a
single product market.22
I explore the following types of tests as employed in past seminal
cases in turn: (1) whether the products are reasonably interchangeable
from a consumer's perspective 23 ; (2) whether two products are given to
separate efficient provision 24 ; and (3) the hypothetical monopolist test.2 5
I identify and describe these tests separately, but in practice, all three
intersect and attempt to answer the same question: What goods "have
reasonable interchangeability for the purpose for which they are pro-
duced" such that they fall within the bounds of the relevant product
market?
In determining whether to include two or more products in the same
product market, courts look to whether the products are reasonably inter-
changeable to consumers. 26 "In determining the market under the Sher-
man Act, it is the use or uses to which the commodity is put that
control." 27 Specifically, the "market is composed of products that have
reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are pro-
duced-price, use and qualities considered." 28 The inquiry focuses on
the functional aspects of given products.
Another form of the inquiry asks whether two allegedly separate
products can be efficiently provided to consumers. "For service and
parts to be considered two distinct products, there must be sufficient con-
sumer demand so that it is efficient for a firm to provide service sepa-
20 U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 588 (1966).
21 U.S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 395-96 (1956).
22 See e.g., id.
23 See e.g., U.S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 395-96 (1956); Eastman
Kodak v. Image Technical Serv.'s, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992).
24 See e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21-22;
25 See e.g., F.T.C. v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1038 (2008).
26 See e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85, 111 (1984) ("The District Court employed the correct test for determining whether
college football broadcasts constitute a separate market-whether there are other products that
are reasonably substitutable.").
27 United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1956).
28 Id. at 404. See also, Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Serv.'s, Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
481-482 (1992) ("The relevant market for antitrust purposes is determined by the choices
available to Kodak equipment owners.").
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rately from parts." 29 Despite an apparent focus on possible or
hypothetical efficient provision, supporting evidence tends to consist of
proof that the two products are, or have been, provided separately, either
by the particular antitrust defendant or by one of the defendant's compet-
itors. 3 0 This form of the inquiry provides a relatively lax criterion com-
pared to reasonable substitutability and is treated as a minimum test to
separate markets. 3 1
Courts and scholars also employ the Hypothetical Monopolist Test
(HMT) as a means of defining a relevant market, especially in merger
cases. The HMT asks whether, if there was only a single seller of a
given product, could that seller profitably impose a "small but significant
and non-transitory increase in price," (SSNIP) defined as an increase of
5% or more. 32 If a single seller could profitably take such action, then
the market is properly defined.3 3 If a single seller could not profitably
impose an SSNIP, then the market is likely too narrow to be cognizable
for antitrust inquiry and needs to be expanded to include other reasona-
bly interchangeable goods or services. 3 4 The SSNIP provides proof that
the hypothetically monopolized product market is not vulnerable to sub-
stitutes outside that market. Because the product or products in that mar-
ket cannot be readily substituted for others not included in the market,
products outside the market are not reasonably interchangeable.
All three tests form part of the same generalized inquiry and are
useful guideposts for performing the necessary analysis. A defined mar-
29 Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Serv.'s, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992). Note that
the tests here are not ultimate authorities, but, the D.C. Circuit observed, proxies: "Jefferson
Parish does not endorse a direct inquiry into the efficiencies of a bundle. Rather, it proposes
easy-to-administer proxies for net efficiency . . . . [T]he separate-products test is not a one-
sided inquiry into the cost savings from a bundle .... [T]he Court conspicuously did not adopt
that approach in its disposition of tying arrangement before it. Instead it chose proxies that
balance costs savings against reduction in consumer choice." United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
30 See e.g., id. at 462-63, 480; Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. at
21-22 (1992).
31 See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Serv.'s, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 494 n.2 (1992)
(citing Jefferson Parish Hospital, Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 39 (1984) ("For products to
be treated as distinct, the tied product must, at a minimum, be one that some consumers might
wish to purchase separately without also purchasing the tying product.") (emphasis in
original)).
32 Department of Justice & the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines, Issued Aug. 19, 2010 [hereinafter "2010 Merger Guidelines"]; F.T.C. v. Whole Foods
Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1038 (2008) ("If a small price increase would drive consumers to
an alternative product, then that product must be reasonably substitutable for those in the
proposed market and must therefore be part of the market, properly defined."); Coastal Fuels
of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 198 (1st Cir. 1996) ("The
touchstone of market definition is whether a hypothetical monopolist could raise prices.").
33 F.T.C. v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1038 (2008).
34 See id.
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ket sets the parameters for analyzing alleged anticompetitive conduct un-
derlying plaintiffs' antitrust claims.
B. Predatory Pricing
Predatory pricing targets sellers who price their products below
their cost of production to force competitors to either charge uncompeti-
tive high prices or sell at a loss until they exit the market.3 5 Courts and
scholars are very skeptical of predatory pricing claims because prevailing
wisdom (and common sense) counsel that lower prices are good for com-
petition and for consumers. 36 The costs of erroneously finding liability
are extremely high-"[T]he mechanism by which a firm engages in
predatory pricing-lowering prices-is the same mechanism by which a
firm stimulates competition; because cutting prices in order to increase
business often is the very essence of competition."
As a result, the Supreme Court promulgated a strict and difficult to
prove test for predatory pricing claims. In Brooke Group v. Brown and
Williamson Tobacco, the Supreme Court ruled that to succeed on a pred-
atory pricing claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant's prices
are below an appropriate measure of the defendant's costs and (2) that
the defendant had a "dangerous probability" of recouping the losses in-
curred from the alleged scheme by charging supracompetitive prices in
some later period, presumably after driving competitors from the mar-
ket.37 This is commonly referred to as the "price-cost test."38
The price-cost test appears appropriate wherever the alleged an-
ticompetitive conduct is primarily based on pricing. But whether price is
the primary mechanism of the defendant's anticompetitive conduct is not
always clear. Brooke Group did not offer clear guidance on what "below
cost" entails.3 9 One option is pricing below marginal cost, but this can
be difficult to prove even after discovery, let alone to survive a motion to
35 Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 220-23 (1993).
36 Id. at 226-27 (1993) (citations excluded) ("It would be ironic indeed if the standards
for predatory pricing liability were so low that antitrust suits themselves became a tool for
keeping prices high.").
37 Id. at 222-25 (1993). The Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in Weyerhauser af-
firmed this new rule for predatory bidding claims as well. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 315 (2007). Assembling proof of the second element of
the test has created substantial problems for courts and plaintiffs, but these issues are beyond
the scope of this Note.
38 See Eisai, Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis, 821 F.3d 394, 408 (3rd Cir. 2016); ZF Meritor, LLC
v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 268-69 (3rd Cir. 2012); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Air-
lines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 946 (6th Cir. 2005); Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515
F.3d 883, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2008).
39 Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993) ("[A
plaintiff] must prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its
rival's costs."); Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 905-06 (9th Cir.
2008).
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dismiss. Another option is to use average variable cost as a proxy for
marginal cost, as in the gas station hypothetical below. This option has
gained the most traction among courts and scholars as the best realistic
option.40
Consider, gas station A and gas station B are the only gas stations in
Hay City, such that consumers in Hay City have no reasonable substitute
suppliers of gasoline. If station A sells each gallon of gasoline below its
average variable cost to undercut station B and drive it out of business,
station B clearly has a predatory pricing claim. But if A sells gasoline at
increasing discounts for increasing volumes, does station B accrue a
claim only if all gallons of gas are sold below variable cost? Or does
station B accrue a claim based on gas sold by A through the discount
program if the price of the discounted gas is below average variable
cost? Or alternatively, does station B only accrue a claim on those gal-
lons of gas sold below A's marginal cost of producing those gallons? 4 1
Some scholars suggest that single-product loyalty discounts can be
better analogized to exclusive dealing arrangements than predatory pric-
ing schemes.42 This would effectively bolster a plaintiffs claims against
single-product loyalty discounts by allowing a plaintiff to avoid the strin-
gent Brooke Group price-cost test. In contrast, the Third Circuit decided
in ZF Meritor v. Eaton Corp. that the price-cost test applied to single-
product loyalty discounts only where pricing is "the clearly predominant
mechanism of exclusion." 4 3
Courts confront further complications about whether the price-cost
test applies when producers award volume-based discounts on purchases
of two or more product lines. Modifying the previous example-when
does station B accrue an antitrust claim if station A is selling gas above
cost but includes a free car wash for every gas purchase, necessarily sell-
ing the car wash below average variable cost? I address these and simi-
lar issues in Part I.D, infra "Bundling."
40 Id. at 907 (citations omitted).
41 An inquiry into selling below marginal cost necessarily focuses on sales at the margin.
An inquiry into average variable costs focuses on overall sales. Under the latter, a seller could
discount below marginal cost and still be pricing above average variable cost for some portion
of its sales, giving sellers more leeway to discount and potentially sacrifice profits on some
units to increase market share. The reverse-pricing below average variable cost and above
marginal cost-would not occur unless a seller is operating at inefficiently low levels of
production.
42 Benjamin Klein & Andres V. Lerner, Price-Cost Tests In Antitrust Analysis Of Single
Product Loyalty Contracts, 80 Antitrust L.J. 631, 631 et seq. (2016).
43 ZF Meritor v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 271 (3d Cir. 2012).
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C. Tie-Ins
Tie-ins are sales arrangements that require a buyer to purchase a
second good (the tied product) in order to purchase the first good (the
tying product). "There are four elements to a per se tying violation: (1)
the tying and tied goods are two separate products; (2) the defendant has
market power in the tying product market; (3) the defendant affords con-
sumers no choice but to purchase the tied product from it; and (4) the
tying arrangement forecloses a substantial volume of commerce."44
Tying arrangements are anticompetitive because a seller of tied
products can leverage market power in the tying product market to fore-
close competition in the tied product market. A seller of tied products
must have market power in the tying product market to have an anticom-
petitive effect and create an antitrust claim. If ski manufacturer A ref-
uses to sell pairs of skis to consumers unless consumers also each
purchase a ski jacket as well, the tying arrangement is only anticompeti-
tive if the ski manufacturer has power in the market for skis. If the ski
manufacturer does not have market power, then consumers can weigh
whether to purchase the skis-ski jacket combination from A, or purchase
the pair of skis from manufacturer B and a ski jacket from manufacturer
C. But if ski manufacturer A is the only producer of skis, then a con-
sumer cannot purchase skis without also buying the ski jacket from A.
This forecloses the market for ski jackets-the tied product. Thus, not
all tying arrangements can cause substantial foreclosure of competition
in the tied market, only those arrangements in which a seller has market
power in the tying product market.
With respect to the first element, the Supreme Court reasoned in
Jefferson Parish that whether two separate products are amenable to a
tying arrangement "depends on whether the arrangement may have the
type of competitive consequences addressed by the rule" prohibiting tie-
ins.4 5 Furthermore, "no tying arrangement can exist unless there is suffi-
cient demand for the purchase" of one good or service separately from
the other good or service. 46 One must be able "to identify a distinct
product market in which it is efficient to offer" the allegedly tied product
and tying product separately. 47
With respect to the second element of market power in the tying
product, market power is the seller's power "to force a purchaser to do
44 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Eastman
Kodak v. Image Technical Serv.'s, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-462 (1992).
45 Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984).
46 Id. at 2.
47 Id. 21-22.
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something that he would not do in a competitive market."48 It is the
ability to raise price and restrict output.4 9 A plaintiff can show that a
defendant has market power through direct evidence.50 But more often
plaintiffs use market share as a proxy for inferring market power.5 1
Without market power in the tying product, a seller cannot foreclose
competition in the tied market because competitors in the tying and tied
markets can compete effectively in both individual markets as well as in
the market for the bundle of the tying and tied product.
For many years, courts presumed that a patented product possessed
market power by virtue of its government-granted monopoly through the
patent. But in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., the Su-
preme Court ended that presumption of market power in antitrust cases
citing Congress's 1988 amendments to the Patent Act, which had ended
the presumption of market power in patent misuse cases.52 Thus, gov-
ernment-granted monopoly on production, sales, and use of a product or
service does not necessarily imply market power.53
With respect to the third element, coerced purchase of the tied prod-
uct is the essence of a tie-in claim. "[T]he essential characteristic of an
invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control
over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied prod-
uct that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have preferred to
purchase elsewhere on different terms." 54 Such coercion causes direct
foreclosure of the market for the tied product that otherwise would not
occur.
The final element of a tie-in is foreclosure of a "substantial"55 or a
"not insubstantial" amount of commerce. 56 The element appears to be a
nominal, highly fact-dependent hurdle to pursuing a tying claim, either
under Section 1 or as a part of a Section 2 claim.57 I do not address this
nebulous element further in this Note.
48 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv.'s, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (quot-
ing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14).
49 U.S. v. E. L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
50 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv.'s, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 477 (1992);
United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 200 (2nd Cir. 2016) (citations excluded).
51 See Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 464.
52 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
53 See id.
54 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
55 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Eastman
Kodak v. Image Technical Serv.'s, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-462 (1992)).
56 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 2 (1984). Cases vary on
whether the final element is a "substantial amount of commerce" or a "not insubstantial
amount of commerce." See id.; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 85 (D.C. Cir.
2001). The standard is the same.
57 See e.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502
(1969) (noting the foreclosed sales of $2,300,000 cannot be considered insubstantial); North-
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Courts also allow sellers to present one or multiple business justifi-
cations as a defense to tying allegations used to support Section 2
claims.58 A valid business reason can rebut a plaintiff s showing of will-
ful acquisition and maintenance of market power. 59 Such valid business
justifications could include quality control, costs savings, or innovation.
With respect to innovation, at least one court has shown deference to a
seller where finding liability for a tie-in may "chill innovation to the
detriment of consumers by preventing firms from integrating into their
products new functionality previously provided by standalone prod-
ucts-and hence, by definition, subject to separate consumer demand." 60
D. Bundling
Courts, practitioners, and scholars use the term "bundling" inconsis-
tently to refer to various types of liable conduct-e.g. the term "bundled
tie" refers to a classic "tying claim." 61 "Price bundling" or "discount
bundling" is the relevant conduct here. I use the term "discount bun-
dling" from here on. "Discount bundling" applies to situations where a
manufacturer combines more than one product together in a discounted
"package," or where two or more products are marketed together and
market power in one product is used to enhance the appeal of a second
product. 62
ern Pacific Railway v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 3, 7 (1958) (noting tying more than 6 million
acres of mineral rights to rail freight purchases cannot be considered insubstantial).
58 Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Serv.'s, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-462 (1992). The
same business justification defense may apply to Section 1 claims as well, depending on the
circumstances. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(finding the per se rule inappropriate in the context of Microsoft's tying its operating system to
its internet browser).
59 Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Serv.'s, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992).
60 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[F]irms with-
out market power will bundle two goods only when the cost savings from joint sale outweigh
the value consumers place on separate choice. . . . If integration has efficiency benefits, these
may be ignored by the Jefferson Parish proxies . . . [b]ecause one cannot be sure beneficial
integration will be protected by the other elements.").
61 The imprecise use of antitrust terminology can muddle understandings of what liable
conduct are at issue in particular applications and in the abstract. For more background on
Section 2 bundling, tying, and related claims, see generally, Dep't of Justice, COMsPETrrION &
MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT, September
2008.
62 See Sec 4:16: Bundling and Loyalty Programs, Corporate Counsel's Antitrust
Deskbook; See also Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 894 (9th Cir.
2008) ("Bundling is the practice of offering, for a single price, two or more goods or services
that could be sold separately."); Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256,
270 (2d Cir 2001) ("[A] bundling arrangement offers discounted prices or rebates for the
purchase of multiple products, although the buyer is under no obligation to purchase more than
one item."); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1062 ("[B]undling or
tying . . . 'cannot exist unless two separate product markets have been linked.'") (quoting
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984)).
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In particular cases, discount bundling functions like single-product
price-cutting when competitors can compete effectively bundle-to-bun-
dle. 6 3 In such cases, the price-cost test is arguably appropriate.6 Where
one firm cannot effectively compete bundle-to-bundle, discount bundling
functions more like product tying. 65 Because the Supreme Court has not
yet grappled with a discount bundling case, discount bundling, unlike
many other more fleshed out categories of anticompetitive conduct, re-
mains a hazy and unstructured realm of antitrust law. 6 6
The antitrust concern with discount bundling is that "it is possible,
at least in theory, for a firm to use a bundled discount to exclude an
equally or more efficient competitor and thereby reduce consumer wel-
fare in the long run." 6 7 A plaintiff who sells only a single product in a
bundle of products sold by a defendant may not be able to match the
post-discount prices of the defendant's entire bundle. 68 Thus, even an
equally efficient producer of the single product may not be able to profit-
ably compete with a competitor who sells a bundle including that single
product above the average cost of the entire bundle.6 9
Because price is an integral element of discount bundling claims,
circuit courts have extrapolated the Supreme Court's holding in Brooke
Group as a signal that discount bundling claims must involve some form
of below-cost pricing for antitrust liability to attach.70 But because
Brooke Group left open the question of what measurement of "cost" is
relevant and what "below cost" must entail, the circuit courts have split
on when and how to apply Brooke Group to discount bundling.
In this context, plaintiffs have mounted two types of bundled dis-
count challenges: "(1) charges that one or more of the items in the pack-
age, as a result of the discount, are sold at 'predatory prices' . . . [and] (2)
that the exclusionary effect of the package discount is much the same as
a conventional tie-in." 7 ' Where courts characterize a challenge to dis-
count bundling as price-based behavior, they apply some version of the
63 DOJ, COMPETITION & MONOPOLY, at 5-6.
64 See supra Part I.A.
65 See supra Part I.B.
66 See Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2008).
The Ninth Circuit attempted to clear the air with its bundling "discount attribution" rule in
PeaceHealth, but as of 2010 at least, the approach had not attracted much case law support.
See Robert Pitofsky, et al, TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 914 (6th ed. 2010).
67 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 896 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 236 (2d ed.2001); Barry Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling,
50 Antitrust Bull. 321, 321 (2005)).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See e.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 903-05 (9th Cir.
2008).
71 Robert Pitofsky, et al, TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 914 (6th ed.
2010).
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price-cost test.7 2 Where courts characterize a challenge to discount bun-
dling as akin to a tie-in or de facto exclusive dealing, they refuse to apply
the price-cost test.7 3 Every circuit court that has addressed discount bun-
dling claims, except the Third Circuit, recognizes some form of cost-
based safe harbor involving an analysis of whether a discount bundling
practice improperly results in below-cost pricing.
In Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, the Ninth Circuit con-
fronted a challenge to bundling different types of hospital services.
Plaintiff healthcare services provider claimed that defendant, a compet-
ing provider, offered health insurers increasing discounts prices for
purchasing primary, secondary, and tertiary hospital services from it
alone. 74 Plaintiff competed in the market for primary and secondary hos-
pital services, but did not provide tertiary services.75 Plaintiff asserted
various claims for relief including monopolization, exclusive dealing,
and tying under Sections 1 and 2.76 Plaintiff appealed summary judg-
ment for defendant on the tying claim, and defendant cross-appealed a
jury verdict for plaintiff on the monopolization claim.77 The Ninth Cir-
cuit adopted a "discount attribution" standard for the discount bundling
claims.78 Under this standard, the full amount of a discount on a bundle
of goods is allocated to the competitive product or products. 79 If the
post-discount-allocation price of the competitive good is below the de-
fendant's cost of production, a fact-finder "may find that the bundled
discount is exclusionary" for purpose of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.80
The discount attribution rule provides a clear standard to guide sell-
ers in offering bundled discounts to consumers without violating antitrust
law. On the other hand, the standard does not settle the debate about the
appropriate measure of cost for calculating below-cost sales under
Brooke Group. The standard also does not capture potentially exclusion-
ary sales arrangements that do not meet the standard. The Ninth Circuit
solution is a useful shortcut that conforms to Brooke Group and provides
clear guidance, but does not necessarily capture all anticompetitive dis-
count bundling arrangements.
Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. pro-
vides another alternative standard.81 The case involved defendant's dis-
72 See e.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008).
73 See e.g., LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2003).
74 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 891 (9th Cir. 2008).
75 Id. at 906.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Ortho Diagnostic Sys.'s, Inc. v. Abbott Lab.'s, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Because, it is a district court case, Ortho is not precedential, but it is a widely cited treatment
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counting across a bundle of products used to screen blood samples for
viruses. 8 2 Under Ortho, to support a Section 2 claim with a discount
bundling arrangement, a plaintiff "must allege and prove either that (a)
the monopolist has priced below its average variable cost or (b) [that] the
plaintiff is at least as efficient a producer of the competitive product as
the defendant, but that the defendant's pricing makes it unprofitable for
the plaintiff to continue to produce."83 Roughly speaking, a competitor
is equally or more efficient when it matches the same per-unit cost struc-
ture, or achieves a lower per-unit cost structure, respectively, for the
same product.84 Under this test, below-cost pricing is only one possible
indicator of exclusionary conduct; the bundled pricing scheme can still
be exclusionary even if the goods are sold above cost.8 5 Thus,.the stan-
dard does a better job capturing anticompetitive conduct that does not
strictly conform to the spirit of Brooke Group. However, the standard
does not provide much guidance to sellers offering bundled discounts on
how to avoid potential antitrust violations.
Prevailing law in the Third Circuit suffers from a similar deficiency
in providing guidance to sellers. The seminal case is LePage's Inc. v.
3M.8 6 LePage's produced private label transparent tape.8 7 3M produced
its own brand name transparent tape, and entered the market for private
label tape several years after LePage' S.88 3M also sold a variety of other
related and unrelated products, such as stationary and pens, as well as
healthcare and automotive products.89 3M offered retailers progressively
higher discounts for increased purchases across 3M product lines.90 Le-
Page's could not match the discounts because it did not provide as di-
verse an array of products. 9 ' A jury found for LePage's on its Section 2
monopolization claim on the basis of 3M's bundled discounts. 9 2
On appeal, the Third Circuit refused to apply the Brooke Group's
price-cost test to the entire bundle-which would have absolved 3M of
liability because it never priced its entire bundle of goods below cost. 9 3
of discount bundling claims. The opinion also provides a good example of how discount
bundling can be exclusionary. Id. at 467. In Cascade Health Solutions, the Ninth Circuit uses
this example in elucidating the discount attribution standard as well. Cascade Health Solu-
tions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d at 896 et seq.
82 Ortho Diagnostic Sys.'s, Inc. v. Abbott Lab.'s, Inc., 920 F. Supp. at 455.
83 Id. at 469.
84 See id. at 467.
85 Id. at 467.
86 LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003).
87 Id. at 144.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 154-156.
91 LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d at 161.
92 Id. at 145.
93 Id. at 147.
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The court reasoned that unlike Brown and Williamson in Brooke Group,
3M was a monopoly in the transparent tape market "with its uncon-
strained market power." 94 "[A] monopolist is not free to take certain
actions that a company in a competitive (or even [an] oligopolistic) mar-
ket may take, because there is no market constraint on a monopolist's
behavior."95 The Third Circuit effectively limited its application of
Brooke Group to straightforward predatory pricing claims because
"[n]othing in any of the Supreme Court's opinions in the decade since
the Brooke Group decision suggested that the opinion overturned de-
cades of Supreme Court precedent that evaluated a monopolist's liability
under § 2 by examining its exclusionary, i.e., predatory, conduct." 96
3M's bundling practices amounted to exclusionary conduct subject to
Section 2, and the Brooke Group price-cost test did not apply to it.97 The
Third Circuit upheld the jury verdict in favor of LePage's on the Section
2 monopolization claim.9 8
The Third Circuit stopped short of extending the LePage's rationale
to single product volume discounts in ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp.99
In ZF Meritor, plaintiff ZF Meritor, a competitor in the heavy-duty truck
transmissions market, brought Section 1 and Section 2 claims against
defendant Eaton Corp., the dominant competitor in that market.1oo Eaton
was a monopolist in the market until ZF Meritor entered in 1989.101 In
the early 2000s, Eaton revised its long-term sales contracts (LTAs, in
industry parlance) with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), ex-
tending the length of their terms, adding aggressive volume and market
share rebates, requiring preferential pricing on Eaton's products (which
apparently was not passed on to consumers), and, in some cases, requir-
ing the OEM to remove competing products from their sales materials. 10 2
Eaton contended that the ZF Meritor had only identified "Eaton's
pricing practices, that incentivized the OEMs to enter into the LTAs, and
because price was the incentive, [the court] must apply the price-cost
test." 103 The Third Circuit acknowledged "that even if a plaintiff frames
its claim as one of exclusive dealing, the price-cost test may be disposi-
tive . .. as a specific application of the 'rule of reason' when the plaintiff
94 Id.
95 Id. at 151-52.
96 Id. at 152.
97 See id.
98 Id. at 169.
99 ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012).
100 Id. at 263.
101 Id. at 264.
102 Id. at 264-266. OEMs list transmissions in "data books," which customers use to
make their selections. Id. at 264. Note that the savings from Eaton's rebate scheme apparently
were not passed on to consumers. Id. at 266.
103 Id. at 273.
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alleges that price is the vehicle of exclusion."104 But the court refused to
apply the price-cost test because the LTAs went much further than offer-
ing simple volume or market share discounts to customers. 0 5 The court
characterized Eaton's LTAs as broader exclusive dealing arrangements
because Eaton used not only pricing and discounting arrangements, but
also (i) coerced OEMs into signing long-term buying contracts by lever-
aging its position as a dominant supplier of parts and (ii) worked in con-
cert with OEMs to block customer access to plaintiffs products by
coercing OEMs into removing or burying competing sales listings.'os
A final standard worthy of mention is the strict application of
Brooke Group to an entire bundle of goods-what the defendant in Cas-
cade Health Solutions called an "aggregate discount rule." 0 7 If the price
of an entire bundle exceeds the total cost of producing all the goods in
the bundle, the bundle passes the first prong of the price-cost test, and a
seller cannot be liable under Section 2. Under this standard, a seller can
assemble a broad bundle of products that an equally efficient competitor
cannot match without incurring antitrust liability. 3M would have pre-
vailed against LePage's because the price of the entire 3M goods bundle
was above 3M's cost of production.
This brings us to the question that the Third Circuit skirted in Eisai
and that presents an ultimate threshold question here: When does a dis-
counting scheme involve multiple products such that an equally efficient
competitor may not be able to compete fairly?
II. EisAi v. SANOFI-AVENTIS
A. Background
The dispute in Eisai centered on a Sanofi anticoagulant drug called
Lovenox, which is used to treat and prevent deep vein thrombosis
(DVT)-blood clotting in the veins.10s Lovenox is a type injectable anti-
coagulant known as low molecular weight heparin (LMWH).1 0 9 Eisai
sold a competing injectable LMWH drug called Fragmin. At the time of
the litigation, the FDA had approved Fragmin for five indications, or
medical use cases."i0 Of its four direct competitors, Lovenox had the
104 Id. at 273 (citing Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1060-1063
(8th Cir. 2000).
105 Id. at 269.
106 Id. at 277.
107 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 914 (9th Cir. 2008)
108 Eisai v. Sanofi Aventis, 821 F.3d 394, 399 (3d Cir 2016).
109 Id.
110 Id.; see also U.S. Nat'l Library of Med., PubMed Heath, last updated 20 Aug. 2015,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/approved-drug-uses/ ("The FDA approves each
drug for one or more indications. An indication is a particular use for the drug, such as treat-
ing asthma. A group of people can also be specified, for example, adults.").
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most indications with seven."' "[F]rom September 27, 2005 (when
Eisai began selling Fragmin) through July 25, 2010 (when Sanofi ended
certain marketing practices after a generic entered the market), Lovenox
had the most indications of the four [competing] drugs [in the broad
overall market for injectable LMWH drugs] . . . and maintained a market
share of 81.5% to 92.3% while Fragmin had the second largest market
share at 4.3% to 8.2%."112
Injectable LMWH drug customers consist either of individual hospi-
tals or, in larger part, group purchasing organizations (GPOs).113 Under
its "Lovenox Acute Contract Value Program," Sanofi granted discounts
to customers who purchased a certain proportion of Lovenox relative to
their total LMWH drug needs.114 If Lovenox constituted less than 75%
of a customer's LMWH purchases, the customer received a 1% dis-
count."1 Above the 75% threshold, a customer received steadily in-
creasing discounts based on volume and purchasing share.116
Eisai filed suit alleging, among other claims, unlawful monopoliza-
tion and attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act based on the contract discount program, together with a
formulary access clause and a marketing campaign allegedly targeted at
discrediting Eisai and Fragmin, constituted anticompetitive conduct.' '
There is a strong analogy-heavily leveraged by Eisai, and rejected by
the court-between the facts in Eisai and those of LePage's. In both
cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's discounting arrangement
was exclusionary conduct that, in conjunction with other alleged non-
discount-related conduct, supported monopolization and attempted mo-
nopolization claims.
Eisai's expert asserted that "the Lovenox program restricted rival
sales by bundling each customer's contestable demand for Lovenox ...
with the customer's incontestable demand.""18 Lovenox's incontestable
demand was based in part on its unique cardiology indication.' As a
result, the discount program created a "dead zone" where any customer
choosing to increase its Fragmin purchase share from 10% to any amount
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. "A group purchasing organization (GPO) is an entity that is created to aggregate
the purchasing volume of a group of businesses to obtain discounts from vendors based on the
collective buying volume of the GPO members." Essensa, What is Group Purchasing?, http://
essensa.org/aboutus/WhatIsGroupPurchasing.aspx.
114 Id. at 400.
I1s Eisai v. Sanofi-Aventis, 821 F.3d 394, 400 (3d Cir 2016).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 401.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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less than 62% would spend more on LMWH drugs despite Fragmin's
lower price.1 2 0
B. Plaintiffs Theory
In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that the broadest possible market
was for the Lovenox category of LMWH anticoagulant drug.121 But
plaintiff also alleged that the relevant FDA indications for the LWMH
drugs constituted their own separate "Relevant Use Markets." 1 2 2
Eisai claimed that Sanofi's conduct operated to substantially fore-
close the market for Lovenox-type anticoagulants in two ways.1 2 3 First,
plaintiff claimed that Lovenox's "monopoly-share" condition for price
discounts "operates as a de facto one-way exclusive dealing arrange-
ment."1 24 Second, through its monopoly position in various cardiology
and orthopedic uses "Sanofi-Aventis has coerced the use of Lovenox(R)
for other Relevant Use Markets . . . which has eliminated or effectively
eliminated competition between Sanofi-Aventis and Eisai regarding that
market."1 2 5 Thus, plaintiff originally alleged a sound theory of func-
tional markets for individual use cases.126
But in its brief in opposition to defendant's motion for summary
judgment, plaintiff appeared to abandon the allegations in the complaint
that FDA indications defined the relevant submarkets for analyzing an-
ticompetitive effect.1 2 7 The brief references only the "LTC market"
throughout.1 2 8 Plaintiff appeared to fall back on its expert's testimony
on bundling "contestable" and "incontestable" demand for a single prod-
uct within in the LTC/LWMH anticoagulant market overall.
C. District Court Decision
In ruling on defendant's motion for summary judgment, the district
court "assume[d], arguendo, that the relevant market is the [LWMH]
120 Id.
121 Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 1 56, Eisai v. Sanofi-Aventis, U.S., LLC, No.
08CV04168 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter "Compl."].
122 Id.
123 Id. ¶ 63.
124 Id.
125 Id. ¶ 68.
126 Note that the plaintiff alleged but did not prove this theory.
127 Plaintiff Eisai Inc.'s Opposition to Sanofi-Aventis's Motion to Dismiss, Eisai v. Sa-
nofi-Aventis, U.S., LLC, No. 08CV04168, 1-3 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2008).
128 E.g. id. at 1 n.1. ("As detailed in the Complaint (11 52-56), and undisputed by [Sa-
nofi] in its motion to dismiss, the broadest relevant market in this case is the market for inject-
able anticoagulants defined in [Sanofi's] Lovenox@ contracts as the "Lovenox@ Therapeutic
Class." Thus, the relevant products are described herein as "LTC" products and the relevant
market as the "LTC Market."). The "LTC market" is equivalent to the "injectable LWMH
market." Compare Eisai District Court Decision and Eisai v. Sanofi-Aventis, 821 F.3d at 399
(3d Cir 2016).
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market-Lovenox@, Fragmin@, Innohep@, and Arixtra@."129 "[T]he
Court, for summary judgment purposes, adopts the more limited market
definition provided by Eisai."o30 In a fairly comprehensive opinion sur-
veying the relevant case law, the district court granted Sanofi's motion
for summary judgment on all claims. The court determined that price
operated as Sanofi's primary means of exclusion and any antitrust claims
failed because Sanofi's prices were above cost.13' It further held that the
evidence did not support an exclusive dealing claim and that Eisai could
not establish that its lower market share was due to Sanofi's anticompeti-
tive conduct.1 32 The district court did not address the complaint's allega-
tion that the FDA-approved indications, rather than the drug type
(injectable LMWH), defined the relevant markets.
D. Third Circuit Rationale
On appeal, the Third Circuit also noted that " . . . a bundling ar-
rangement generally involves discounted rebates or prices for the
purchase of multiple products."l33 Eisai did not claim that Sanofi condi-
tioned discounts on purchases across various product lines, but on differ-
ent types of demand for the same product.1 3 4 Eisai did not argue that the
existence of different types of demand for Lovenox resulted in different
market demand structures for Lovenox defined by the relevant indica-
tions at issue. 13 The Third Circuit did not elaborate on the possibility
that multiple use cases for Lovenox could have given the LWMH market
the flavor of multiple products exchanged in multiple product markets.
The Court made several points critical of Eisai's theory. The Court
noted that "[e]ven if bundling of different types of demand for the same
product could . . . foreclose competition, nothing in the record indicates
that an equally efficient competitor was unable to compete with Sa-
nofi."1 3 6 The court then stated that the evidence did not suggest that the
fixed costs of obtaining FDA approval for a cardiology indication were
so high as to create barriers to entering the market. Furthermore, Eisai
did not articulate how much "incontestable demand" flowed from the
unique cardiology indication as opposed to other factors.1"3
129 Eisai v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, 2014 WL 1343254, at 24 (D. N.J. Mar. 28, 2014)
(citing Compl. at ¶ 52) [hereinafter "Eisai District Court Decision"].
130 Id. at 25.
131 Id. at 402.
132 Id.
133 Eisai v. Sanofi-Aventis, 821 F.3d at 406 (emphasis added).
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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These additional factors may have been fatal to Eisai's demand bun-
dling theory even if the court had accepted it. But Eisai's articulation of
its theory and the court ignore strong legal and economic arguments for
treating different indications of the same drug as two different products
for bundling analysis.
E[. USE CASE PRODUCT MARKETS AND TIE-INs
From this foundation of antitrust doctrine, I argue that a demand
type tie-in (or a multiple use case tie-in) can be anticompetitive and can
serve as evidence to support a Section 2 claim if: (1) two different use
cases for a single product function as separate products and define sepa-
rate product markets; (2) a seller has market power in one of the use case
markets (the tying use case); (3) the arrangement gives consumers in the
tying use case market no reasonable alternative but to purchase the prod-
uct for the tied use case from the same seller (a coerced purchase); and
(4) the arrangement causes foreclosure in the market for the tied use
case. The anticompetitive effect of this arrangement is foreclosure in the
use case market in which the seller does not have market power. The
crux of the argument is that a single product in the lay sense can function
as multiple products in an economic and antitrust sense. This Part exam-
ines how my argument fits into the law governing tie-in arrangements.
To determine if Sanofi effectively tied Lovenox's monopolized car-
diovascular indication with other competitive indications in an anticom-
petitive manner, first, we have to define the relevant product market.
Second, we need to determine whether Sanofi exercised market power in
the relevant use case product market. Third, we need to determine
whether Sanofi imposed a tie-in arrangement on Lovenox customers. Fi-
nally, we need to determine whether Sanofi's conduct foreclosed a sub-
stantial portion of the relevant market.
A. Defining the Product Market: The Spirit of Reasonable
Interchangeability
Courts define product markets based on what products "have rea-
sonable interchangeability for the purpose for which they are produced-
price, use and qualities considered." 1 3  Courts' definitions of relevant
product markets are consistent with the idea that the literal, lay concept
of a single product can function as multiple products, each with a distinct
product market. The crux is interchangeability. If one use of a product
is not interchangeable with another use of the same product, this is not
consistent with the definition of a single market. Given barriers to using
the product for a given use case, one use case is not interchangeable with
138 U.S. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956).
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another. Thus, a single product with multiple use cases could clear the
test for functional interchangeability characteristic of multiple products.
Eisai's Fragmin does not share Sanofi Lovenox's cardiovascular in-
dication. The FDA did not approve substituting Fragmin for Lovenox
for this cardiovascular indication. Thus, the products are not reasonably
interchangeable for that indication, or for any other non-overlapping in-
dication between the two drugs.
The separate efficient provision test does not necessarily preclude
the idea that a single product could function as two separate products in
two separate product markets. If a product has two use cases and the
government has only approved Company A's sale of the product for one
use and Company B's sale of the product for the second use, that product
satisfies the separate efficient provision test. A single product with mul-
tiple use-cases easily clears this test, where, for example, the government
approves A's selling the product for use cases 1 and 2, but only approves
B's selling the same product for use case 1.
Eisai and Sanofi provide Fragmin and Lovenox, respectively, for
different indications. They have marketed and sold these drugs for their
respective purposes for sufficient time that the two indications can be
provided separately efficiently.
The theory also holds if the market is defined under the HMT. In
applying the HMT, we start with the narrowest possible market. If a hy-
pothetical monopolist can profitably impose an SSNIP on the market, the
market is properly defined. If the narrow market fails the HMT, then we
expand the definition of the market until it is consistent with the HMT.
The narrowest possible market in Eisai is that for Lovenox's cardio-
vascular indication alone because the FDA has approved only Lovenox
for that indication. Sanofi could profitably impose an SSNIP on Love-
nox without losing market share because it is a monopolist in the cardio-
vascular indication. 139 But Sanofi could lose market share in the other
indications, because its SSNIP would apply to Lovenox for all approved
indications. If Sanofi could execute price discrimination between Love-
nox's cardiovascular indication and its other approved indications, it
could impose an SSNIP without losing market share in the other indica-
tions. Sanofi can leverage inelastic demand for Lovenox's cardiovascu-
lar indication by charging much more for the product market share
expected to go to the unique cardiovascular indication and heavily dis-
counting sales over the volume purchased for the unique indication. This
arrangement could foreclose competition by giving customers no eco-
nomically competitive choice but Lovenox for all indications. The an-
139 I merely use the cardiovascular indication as an example. Sanofi could profitably
impose an SSNIP for all monopolized/noncompetitive indications.
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ticompetitive effect mirrors that of a two-product tie-in or a multi-
product discount bundling arrangement.
B. Market Power in the Tying Product
Given the Supreme Court's ruling in Illinois Tool, government-
granted monopoly over a product does not create a presumption of mar-
ket power. 140 Assuming that a similar burden applies wherever govern-
ment regulation provides incidental barriers to entry, a plaintiff in Eisai's
situation would have to prove market power in the alleged tying product
as well. A plaintiff can prove market power through either direct evi-
dence or through indirect evidence by using market share as a proxy for
market power and by showing that there are barriers to market entry. To
demonstrate market power in the latter case, a plaintiff needs to show:
(1) substantial market share in the tying product and (2) that government
regulation incidentally creates substantial barriers to entry that prevent
potential competitors from competing for the same use case.141
Thus, Eisai would have to show market power in the individual use
case product markets defined by the FDA indications. Because Lovenox
is the only FDA-approved drug for certain indications, then, if Eisai
could demonstrate substantial barriers to entry in that use case (indica-
tion) product market, Eisai could demonstrate that Sanofi possesses mar-
ket power in the market for that indication-monopoly power in fact,
based on government regulation's incidental monopoly protection. Eisai
alleged barriers to entry for competitors seeking approval to use an
LWMH/LTC drug for a new indication, but these may not have been
sufficiently particular and substantial to support a finding of market
power. 14 2 If Eisai could have made such a showing, this should have
been sufficient for alleging a tying claim.
C. Coerced Purchase
Assuming that Sanofi has market power in the cardiovascular indi-
cation for Lovenox, it can leverage that indication to coerce other
purchases. The case did not exhibit a direct tie-in and coerced purchase.
Rather, if the plaintiff's allegations are correct, customers effectively
have no reasonable economic alternative but to purchase additional quan-
tities of Lovenox for other, non-unique indications as well. Therefore,
Sanofi's discounting arrangement resembles a de facto exclusive dealing
arrangement.
140 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006).
141 In theory, natural market conditions could also create the necessary barriers to entry.
142 Compl. at 1 55-57. The complaint simply does not provide much detail regarding
barriers to earning FDA approval for additional indications.
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D. Conclusion
A use case product tie-in causes market foreclosure in the same
manner as a classic tie-in. The seller can leverage market power in one
use case to foreclose competition in another use case, either through a
classic forced tie-in or through a discount bundling scheme.
In Eisai's case, Sanofi's Lovenox market power in two indications
provided the tying product (the "incontestable demand" in Professor
Elhauge's parlance). Heavy discounting on volume purchases for com-
petitive indications over and above consumer need for the indications in
which Sanofi had market power provided the tying mechanism. The
competitive indications in which Fragmin and Lovenox compete pro-
vided the tied product. Thus, if the other elements of a tie-in claim were
present, Sanofi's discounting practices could cause foreclosure in the tied
indication product market.
For the foregoing reasons, use case product market tie-ins can func-
tion as anticompetitive conduct supporting a Section 2 claim where a
single product has multiple use cases, and a plaintiff can show the other
classic elements of a tying claim. In the Eisai case, then, assuming a
sufficient showing of market power in noncompetitive indications (and
barring a business justification defense), Sanofi's conduct could have
been anticompetitive within the meaning of Section 2.
IV. USE CASE PRODUCT MARKETS AND DISCOUNT BUNDLING
This Part examines how my argument fits into the law on discount
bundling. Analyzing Eisai's claim under a discount bundling paradigm
yields a similar result: where use cases define the relevant product mar-
kets, a seller can leverage unique use cases in a single product to fore-
close competition in other use cases. As in the tie-in analysis, the
argument is that a single product in the lay sense can function as multiple
products in an economic and antitrust sense. The arrangement resembles
a bundle because Sanofi is effectively discounting across multiple prod-
ucts-its indications-to exclude other producers of this particular
LMWH/LTC drug that do not produce an equally diverse product line
(set of indications). Under each of the three leading case rationales on
discount bundling, the anticompetitive effect can be the same for use
case product discount bundling as for traditional product discount
bundling.
A. Cascade Health Solutions: Discount Attribution Standard
Under the Cascade Health Solutions discount attribution standard,
if, when a seller's full discount on a bundle is applied to a competitive
use case, that use case is sold below cost, then the discount bundling
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arrangement may be exclusionary. If Sanofi's discounts on volumes
greater than the volume purchased for a monopoly indication result in
sales of that (or those, if there are multiple) indication below cost, the
arrangement may be exclusionary.
The downside of the discount attribution standard holds true for use
case product bundling as well: the seller may be able to heavily discount
a competitive use case without selling that use case below average varia-
ble cost and still achieve an exclusionary effect. Sanofi could sell Love-
nox volumes over the volume needed for its unique indication above
average variable cost and still hobble competitors and potential competi-
tors. Another downside is that it would be difficult to prove that Sanofi
is discounting competitive indications because the end user, rather than
the seller, decides how to use a given volume of Lovenox.
B. The Equally Efficient Competitor
Under the second prong of the Ortho test, a plaintiff would need to
prove that it is an equally efficient competitor in the market for a given
use case. Such a plaintiff must show that it has the same or a lower per-
unit cost structure then the defendant and yet, the defendant's bundling
mechanism still excludes plaintiff's product from the market. Where dis-
count bundles involve use case product markets, the analysis could be
slightly easier because the single product's cost structure (average varia-
ble cost) is likely to be equivalent or very similar across all use cases. 1 4 3
Eisai would have to prove that it is at least as efficient as Sanofi in pro-
ducing and marketing Fragmin as Sanofi is at producing and marketing
Lovenox for the overlapping indications.
C. LePage's: No Cost-Based Standard
Under the LePage's standard, a plaintiff would have to show that
the defendant is a monopolist and that its discounting practices are exclu-
sionary. But a monopolist in what exactly? In LePage's, the Third Cir-
cuit never precisely specified what market 3M was a monopolist in. In
the eyes of the court, 3M appeared to be a monopolist in branded trans-
parent tape, and 3M seemed to have used that power to become a monop-
olist in the private label tape market by excluding LePage's from the
market. But the bundling scheme in that case leveraged discounts across
a wide array of 3M products, not just branded and private label tape, and
the court does not make a judgment on whether 3M is a monopolist in
143 This is a simplifying assumption based on average variable costs that may not reflect
reality using average total cost if, for example, gaining government approval for different use
cases requires different upfront investments.
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the markets for some or all the goods constituting a given discounted
bundle.
Assuming the court meant that 3M's position as a monopolist in
branded transparent tape met the first prong of the test, then a plaintiff in
a similar use case product market case would have to show that a defen-
dant is a monopolist in one of those use cases included in the bundled
discount. Then the plaintiff would have to show that this practice is
exclusionary.
In a use case product market example, this analysis essentially col-
lapses into the tie-in analysis for disputes like Eisai. Eisai could prove
the first prong of the test by pointing to Sanofi's monopoly on its unique,
FDA-approved cardiology indication. Then Eisai could prove that the
discounting practice is exclusionary because customers have no true eco-
nomic choice but to purchase additional volume for competitive, non-
monopoly indications from Sanofi.
D. Aggregate Discount Rule: Price-Cost Across the Entire Bundle
Strict application of the price-cost test to an entire bundle of use
case products yields the same result as strict application of price-cost to
traditional bundling claims. As long as the price of the entire bundle is
above the cost of production of the entire bundle, a seller does not violate
Brooke Group, and its actions are not anticompetitive. This standard
would allow a monopolist in one use case to increase the price of the
monopoly indication to fund ever-greater discounts on the competitive
indication. Applied to Eisai, this standard is essentially what the district
court and the Third Circuit applied by grouping all LMWH/LTC indica-
tions into a single market.
E. Conclusion
Under a bundling paradigm of exclusionary conduct, the result is
the same as in the tying analysis-a seller can leverage market power in
one use case product market to exclude competitors in another use case.
As is the case for traditional product bundles, the application form of
Brooke Group's price-cost test impacts whether or not an antitrust defen-
dant has acted anticompetitively, and the current prevailing standards all
suffer from similar faults when applied to use case product markets. Fur-
ther, the discount attribution standard suffers an additional handicap of
being extremely difficult to prove.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS
The argument here is inherently narrow in theory and probably nar-
row in practice. The argument that a single product can functionally be
two products, in two separate product markets, for purposes of antitrust
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liability is most applicable where the government has granted a monop-
oly on one of a product's use cases. Patents are the most obvious source
of such a monopoly, but there are other potential sources as well. The
FDA indication in Eisai is a case in point. Because of Illinois Tool, a
government-granted monopoly does not necessarily attach market power
to a given use case; a plaintiff would still have to prove it. This applica-
tion of antitrust law would provide a weapon for attacking volume dis-
counts that improperly leverage government sanction of commercial use
for anticompetitive purposes.
A. Analogy with Price Discrimination
There is an analogy between my argument and government's argu-
ment in merger cases FTC v. Whole Foods Market and U.S. v. Vail Re-
sorts. In those cases, the government argued that a challenged merger
would negatively impact certain strata of consumers. 144 Those strata had
more inelastic demand for the products sold by the merging parties, and
hence would bear the brunt of any anticompetitive effect of the
merger. 145 In those cases, certain consumers could not reasonably sub-
stitute another product for that sold by the merging parties. 1 4 6 In Eisai,
the consumers of the indication of Lovenox in which Sanofi has market
power have no reasonable substitutes for that indication-like the strata
of consumers in Whole Foods and Vail.
B. Source of Use Case Product Market Power
The question that remains is whether a seller can enjoy market
power in a use case for a single good based on something other than
government sanction. The answer is likely "no" for two reasons. First,
market power in one of multiple use cases for a single product in which
the seller does not have monopoly power suggests that potential competi-
tors could quickly and easily enter the market for the other use case-
simply sell the product for the other use case. Second, if exogenous nat-
ural (as opposed to government-enforced) barriers to entry hinder com-
petitors from entering the market for the other use case, potential
competitors can compete to surmount those barriers-like the argument
the defense made in Eisai with respect to competing to attain certain
FDA indications. Barriers to entry include any downside of buying from
144 FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1038-39 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Compet-
itive Impact Statement, U.S. v. Vail Resorts, Inc., No. 97-B-10, at 5-6 (D. Colo. Jan 22, 1997)
(noting that the challenged merger likely would not negatively impact destination skiers but
that the merger would result in higher prices for local skiers as a result of reduced
competition).
145 FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1038-39 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Compet-
itive Impact Statement, U.S. v. Vail Resorts, Inc., No. 97-B-10, at 5-6 (D. Colo. Jan 22, 1997)
146 FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1038-39 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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another seller of the same drug that is approved for only certain indica-
tions. For use case products, switching costs may be higher as a general
matter than for traditional products because of a consumer's natural ten-
dency, in the interest of convenience, to purchase volume for all uses
from the same source.
This begs a more difficult question that the Third Circuit broached
indirectly. When are barriers to entry low enough that a court should
eschew a finding of liability and instead find that the potential competitor
in one use case market should enter and compete in the market for the
other use case? In Eisai, the Third Circuit noted that Eisai could com-
pete to attain the FDA indications in which Sanofi possessed market
power. 147 A general rule obliging a competitor to compete in all use case
markets for which a single product is potentially suited would be an easy
shortcut around use case product antitrust liability (and negate the argu-
ment here), but such a rule would be a blunt instrument for a nuanced
problem and it would allow sellers to foreclose competition in the vari-
ous manners described here. 148
C. Competing for Indications and the Equally Efficient Competitor
In Eisai the Third Circuit Court noted that "[e]ven if bundling of
different types of demand for the same product could . .. foreclose com-
petition, nothing in the record indicates that an equally efficient competi-
tor was unable to compete with Sanofi."149 In other words, the evidence
did not suggest that the fixed costs of obtaining FDA approval for a car-
diology indication were so high as to create barriers to entering the
market. 50
One problem with this statement is its focus on fixed costs to entry
when the inquiry into an equally efficient competitor seems to be focused
on marginal cost and average variable cost. The Third Circuit also failed
to explain why Eisai's entering the market for Sanofi's unique indication
would be presumptively easy such that an equally efficient competitor
could compete. On the other hand, a narrow interpretation of the court's
statement that, assuming Eisai is an equally efficient competitor, Eisai
simply failed to prove that barriers to attaining a new indication pre-
vented it from doing so, is consistent with my argument. As the costs of
entry into a new use case market approach zero, a plaintiffs Section 2
case based on bundling or tying arrangements (involving traditional or
use case products) should become increasingly less viable. In contrast,
147 Eisai v. Sanofi-Aventis, 821 F.3d at 406.
148 There would also be no defensible theoretical reason for restricting such a rule to use
case product markets.
149 Id.
150 See Eisai v. Sanofi-Aventis, 821 F.3d at 405.
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where a plaintiff can prove that the monetary, temporal, and related costs
associated with entering the market for a new use case are significant, it
should also have the opportunity to prove that it is an equally efficient
competitor. Disputes involving use case product markets should mini-
mize problems of proof because the average variable cost of production
for one use should be at least roughly equivalent to that for another use
case.
D. Additional Exclusionary Effect: Eliminating Potential Competitors
Bundling and tying involve two methods of market foreclosure:
squeezing out current competitors and dissuading potential competitors
from entry. With respect to use case product markets, the first means is
as potent as when the arrangement involves traditional product markets,
but the second means of foreclosure could be even more so. Where one
competitor has a monopoly in one use case, it can leverage that market
power to eliminate competition in all the other use cases, assuming that
every use cases' customer base is roughly the same (e.g. Eisai and Sa-
nofi's medical customer base). Leveraging power in one use case to
eliminate competitors in other use cases extinguishes competition in once
competitive use cases and eliminates the closest potential competitors for
the monopoly use case.
E. Completely Separate Customer Bases
Throughout this Note, I assume that the multiple use case products
implicated in bundling and tying arrangements are marketed to the same
or at least partially overlapping customer bases-as in the Eisai dispute.
If the customer base for the use cases are completely different such that,
theoretically, the markets exhibit zero demand and supply effect interac-
tions on each other, an anticompetitive effect from bundling goes away.
A customer of the monopoly use case only would not be induced to
purchase the other use case at any price because the customer has no use
for it. In theory, a tying arrangement could still coerce such a customer
to purchase competitive use cases, which the customer would never use
or potentially resell.
F. Contestable and Incontestable Demand Bundling
Eisai's backup argument that Sanofi's practices bundle "contesta-
ble" and "incontestable" demand failed for several reasons. For one,
Eisai failed to articulate how much "incontestable demand" flowed from
the unique cardiology indication as opposed to other factors.151 At base,
this portion of Eisai's argument is similar to mine. In a single market
151 Id.
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that exhibits one highly inelastic demand structure and one elastic de-
mand structure, depending on the type of customer (a customer of a
unique use case versus a customer of a competitive use case), a seller in
the inelastic portion of the market has power in that portion. 152
This articulation of the theory muddies the explanation for why Sa-
nofi's and similar sales schemes are anticompetitive. First, it asks a court
to recognize a new type of anticompetitive conduct underlying Section 2
claims rather than following more tried and true routes etched in prece-
dent to allege and prove antitrust liability. Second, it's not as if the mar-
ket has an elastic portion of the demand curve and an inelastic portion of
the demand curve and consumers in the market are situated somewhere
along that curve. Instead, consumers in the market for different use cases
overlap, so a single consumer can be situated both on the elastic and the
inelastic portions of the demand curve simultaneously. This is where the
demand bundling argument collapses. A group of customers each with
two different sets of demand preferences depending on how they can use
the single product demanded form different demand curves based on the
two different uses. There are two different supply curves as well. The
seller of the monopoly use case sets the supply curve for that indication.
In the competitive use case, multiple sellers in the market interact with
each other and customers demand preferences to set prices at given quan-
tities along a different curve. The customers and sellers are participating
in two separate markets.' 53
G. The Bundling Guidance Problem Remains
Finally, my argument does nothing to solve the guidance problem
inherent in the discount bundling standards utilized in LePage's and
Ortho. Rather, my argument only aims to argue that a single product for
lay purposes may not function as a single product for antitrust purposes
in the context of seller discounting and tie-in arrangements. Perhaps
there is a necessary trade-off between capturing anticompetitive effects
from bundling and providing meaningful guidance to sellers; if so, then
the answer seems to be a policy choice. This Note does not cover the
issue further.
152 For a full discussion of the plaintiffs demand bundling theory, see Eisai v. Sanofi-
Aventis, 821 F.3d at 401-02.
153 Note that a prohibition on using the one product for both uses provides the impetus for
the separation of the markets by use case. If customers could use the same product for both
use cases, then each can trade off one use for the other after purchasing the product until their
demand preferences in the two markets converge to a single point on the demand curve. Once
every customer in both markets does this, every customer's single set of demand preferences
form just one demand curve in a single market.
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CONCLUSION
This Note put forth a simple premise-that a single product with
multiple use cases can act like multiple products exchanged in multiple
product markets defined by its use cases. The single product's uses can
define the product markets in which it is exchanged if the single product
is not reasonably interchangeable among its multiple uses.
The dispute in Eisai v. Sanofi-Aventis provides a sample scenario
for how this situation could exist. And although both the district court
and the Third Circuit rejected plaintiff Eisai's theory of antitrust liability,
the latter court properly left the door open to such theories on a different
set of facts.
Hopefully this theory (1) will contribute to limiting or eliminating
on otherwise baffling exception to current, product-function based meth-
ods of defining product markets and (2) will have some impact in those
areas of the economy where government regulation deflects concerns
about monopoly and oligopoly and provides an incidental shelter for sell-
ers to engage in anticompetitive conduct.
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